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"Of a Judiciary Nature":
Observations on Chief Justice's

First Opinions*
Diane S. Sykes**
My thanks to Katherine Kmiec and the Pepperdine Law School Chapter
of the Federalist Society for the very kind invitation to leave Wisconsin in
the middle of January and come to Malibu to speak. I am honored and
delighted to be with you this afternoon. I thought it might be appropriate to
offer some observations on our new Chief Justice's first term in the center
chair at the Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, as that term concluded last
June, and as the Court's new term opened in October, the Supreme Court
press corps and political commentators on the left and right focused intently
on how new Chief Justice John Roberts-and new Associate Justice Samuel
Alito-might influence the Court's jurisprudence.
I collected a sampling of the media commentary. Linda Greenhouse of
the New York Times offered this analysis in an article anticipating the
Court's new term: "If Year 1 was the transition for the new Roberts court,
Year 2 is likely to be the test."' She observed that during the Chief Justice
Roberts's first term, "the justices were able to find common ground with
some regularity by agreeing not to decide much."Q So, she said, "the extent
to which the members of the newly configured court were prepared to
confront either precedent or one another remained unclear" at the end of the
term.' But this term, Greenhouse predicted, "will be different. The cases
that the court has agreed to decide ... offer few off-ramps, requiring instead
that the justices proceed to rulings that will define the new court in both
substance and style." 4

* Pepperdine Law School Chapter of the Federalist Society, January 25, 2007. This speech
was also delivered on October 10, 2006, at Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis as part of
the Indiana Supreme Court Lecture series.
** Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1. Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Court May Be Defined in Second Term, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2006, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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David Savage, who covers the Court for the Los Angeles Times, began
his preview of the Court's new term by invoking the new Chief Justice's
now-famous "umpire" metaphor from his confirmation hearing, in which
then-Judge Roberts likened the role of a judge to that of an umpire merely
applying the rules, not making them.5 "Roberts suggested that modesty,
humility and stability in the law were the goals of his umpire credo," Savage
wrote. 6 "Not to make law . . . but merely to interpret existing laws fairly
Savage offered his assessment that "during much of [the new
chief's] first year, he did just that." 8
"But in several cases," Savage continued, "[Roberts] behaved
differently, joining Justice Antonin Scalia [in opinions] that would have
rolled back a major environmental law and undercut states' traditional
authority over the practice of medicine." 9 "Neither," Savage concluded,
"would have qualified as a modest act."' 0 So, the reporter asked, "[o]n the
eve of the court's new term ....

the question that was hanging in the air

during his confirmation hearing remains: Will the new chief justice seek the
right result, or the right's result?""
And then there was this from Charles Lane of the Washington Post: In
light of the Court's changed membership, he wrote, the new term "will be
closely watched not only for the results the court reaches, but for how it
reaches them." 2
As a lower court judge trying to understand the jurisprudential direction
of the Supreme Court, it is this last question that holds the most interest for
me-how does the Roberts Court decide its cases? The public and the press
tend to view the Court's decisions through the prism of politics, looking to
outcomes rather than process and evaluating the Court's work by reference
to approval or disapproval of the bottom line. This is understandable given
that so many of our most hotly debated political and policy issues are
brought to the judicial branch nowadays. But I would prefer to focus today
not so much on the results of the new Chief Justice's first-term of opinions
as their reasoning-the decisional principles that controlled and informed
the outcomes. This is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis. Instead, I
am looking for insight into the Chief Justice's method of decisionmaking.

5. David G. Savage, Is the ChiefJustice Really a JudicialActivist?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006,
at M3, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-savage24sep24,0,4059844.story?
coll=la-opinion-rightrail.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Charles Lane, Justices to Hear Abortion, Integration Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006,
at A6.
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From this, perhaps we can draw some inferences about what the Court's
future might hold.
Let's start with what then-Judge Roberts told us about his approach to
deciding cases during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in the fall of 2005. First, there was that very apt and attractive
"umpire" analogy. He said:
[A] certain humility should characterize the judicial role. Judges
and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around.
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply
them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure
everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever
went to a ball game to see the umpire.13
In a later exchange with Senator Hatch about the nature of the judicial
role, Judge Roberts invoked Marbury v. Madison 14 and reminded us that
"the obligation to decide cases is the only basis for the [judiciary's] authority
to interpret the Constitution and laws." 5 He explained that federal judges
are "careful in making sure that they have a real case" to decide, a "live
dispute between parties who have actual injury.... actual interests at stake,
because that is the basis for [the decision's] legitimacy" as an exercise of the
Article III power.16 He went on: "And then [the judges are] to decide that
case as a judge would, not as a legislator would based on a[ ] view of what's
the best policy but as a judge would based on the law."' 17 He said: "That's
why the Framers were willing to have the judges decide cases that required
them to interpret the Constitution, because they were going to decide ...
according to the rule of law."18
Judge Roberts emphasized that the Framers would not have said to
themselves "'Let's take all the hard issues and give them over to the judges.'
That would have been the furthest thing from their mind."' 19 The courts, he
said, should not have a "dominant role in society" or try to solve "society's
problems." 20 Rather, he said, "[i]t is their job to say what the law is," and
only in the context of deciding actual, concrete cases within the meaning of

13. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts Jr. to be ChiefJustice of the
UnitedStates Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005).
14. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
15. Confirmation Hearing,supra, note 13, at 161.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 158.
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Article 111.21 When the hard issues come, as they inevitably do, he
suggested he would follow the advice of Justice Harlan and "focus again on
the question of legitimacy" and whether the case presents a "question
that..
22
judge[s] are supposed to be deciding rather than someone else."
In response to a question from Senator Spector about stare decisis,
Judge Roberts paraphrased Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78:
"'To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the judges," he said, "they need to be
bound down by rules and precedents. '' 2S "So, even that far back," Judge
Roberts continued, "the founders appreciated the role of precedent in
promoting evenhandedness, predictability, stability, [and the appearance] of
integrity in the judicial process." 24 When questioned by Senator Brownback
about the checks on judicial power, he offered his belief that "the primary
check on the courts has always been judicial self-restraint, and a recognition
on the part of judges that they have a limited task. 25
Beyond his confirmation hearing testimony, the new Chief Justice also
used the occasion of his first commencement address, near the end of his
first term as chief, to offer some additional public comment on his view of
the Court's work. In a speech to the 2006 graduates of the Georgetown
University Law Center, Chief Justice Roberts described what he called the
"clear [jurisprudential] benefits" of a greater degree of consensus on the
Supreme Court: "Unanimity or near unanimity promote clarity and guidance
for the lawyers and for the lower courts trying to figure out what the
Supreme Court meant." 26 While differences among the justices should not
be "artificially suppressed," he continued, "[t]he rule of law is strengthened
when there is greater coherence and agreement about what the law is."27 He
asserted this guiding principle: "If it is not necessary to decide more to
dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide more. The
broader the agreement among the justices, the more likely it is that the
decision is on the narrowest possible ground., 28 He invoked Justice
Frankfurter's insight that "narrow
decision[s] help ensure that '[we] do not
' 29
embarrass the future too much.'
What emerges from our new Chief Justice's confirmation hearing
testimony and his first major public address is that he is: (1) deeply
respectful of the limits on federal judicial power and the prerogatives of the

21.

Id. at 159.

22. Id. at 162.
23. Id. at 142.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 288.
26. Chief Justice Roberts, Address at the 2006 Georgetown Law Center Commencement
Ceremony (May 21, 2006), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webast/eventDetail.cfm ?eventlD=144.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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political branches; (2) attentive to the discretion-limiting force of decisional
rules and precedent; and (3) alert to the need for the Court to speak with
greater clarity about what the law is. To a very significant degree, his first
opinions as chief justice reflect a consistent judicial method firmly grounded
in these attributes.
DaimlerChryslerCorp. v. Cuno 3 0-by no means the most noticed of the
Chief Justice's first opinions-was his most prominent concerning the limits
on federal judicial power. DaimlerChryslerpresented a Commerce Clause
challenge to certain Ohio state and municipal tax credits favoring in-state
investment. 31 The plaintiffs were Ohio taxpayers who asserted that their
state and local tax burdens were increased by tax breaks provided to
DaimlerChrysler for a newly expanded Jeep factory in Toledo. 32 The
district court rejected the challenge, finding no Commerce Clause
violation. 33 The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the municipal
tax credit, but
34
held that the state tax credit violated the Commerce Clause.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, did not reach the
merits of the Commerce Clause claim because the plaintiff-taxpayers lacked
Article III standing to challenge the tax credits. 35 He began his opinion with
the following principles:
Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison . . . , grounded the
Federal Judiciary's authority to exercise judicial review and
interpret the Constitution on the necessity to do so in the course of
carrying out the judicial function of deciding cases. As Marshall
explained, "[tihose who apply the rule to 3articular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule."
The Chief Justice said the determination of whether a matter before the
federal courts is a proper case or controversy "assumes particular importance
in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects 'the37 proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society.'
The case-or-controversy limitation-including the requirement that a
litigant have standing to invoke the authority of the federal court-is
30. 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
31. Id. at 1859.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1860.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1864.
36. Id. at 1860 (citation omitted).
37. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498 (1975))).
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necessary to maintain the "'tripartite allocation of power' set forth in the
Constitution" 38 and prevent the powers of the legislative and executive
branches from being "'swallowed up by the judiciary."' 39 As Chief Justice
Roberts put it: "If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts
have no business
deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of
40
doing so."
Moving on from these foundational principles, the Chief Justice framed
the issue this way: "We have been asked to decide an important question of
constitutional law concerning the Commerce Clause. But before we do so,
we must find that the question is presented in a 'case' or 'controversy' that
is, in James Madison's words, 'of a Judiciary Nature.' 4 1 The phrase "cases
of a Judiciary Nature" appears in the records of the Constitutional
Convention on August 27, 1787, during a discussion about the scope of the
judicial power. 42 Madison's notes reflect that it was "generally supposed"
by the delegates "that the jurisdiction given [in Article III] was
constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature."43 Chief Justice
Roberts elaborated on this original understanding by quoting Chief Justice
Marshall again, this time from a speech he gave while a member of
Congress: "'A case in law or equity,' Marshall remarked, 'was a term. . . of
limited signification. It was a controversy between parties which had taken
a shape for judicial decision.'"44
The plaintiffs in DaimlerChryslerclaimed standing as Ohio taxpayers,
so the Chief Justice concluded his opinion by tracing the Court's precedents
rejecting taxpayer standing in all but a narrow category of Establishment
45
Clause cases and declining to deviate from that long line of precedent.
Standing to sue in federal court requires an actual or imminent particularized
injury, fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and likely to be redressed
by the requested relief.46 The injury asserted by the plaintiff-taxpayers in
DaimlerChryslerwas no more than a grievance shared in common with all
people generally. The Chief Justice noted that the plaintiffs' alleged injury
was wholly conjectural "in that it depends on how legislators res 7ond to a
reduction in revenue, if that is the consequence of the [tax] credit."

38. Id. at 1861 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)).
39. Id. (quoting 4 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95 (C. Cullen ed., 1984)).
40. Id. at 1860-61.
41. Id. at 1861 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (M. Farrand
ed., 1966) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION]).
42. FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 41, at 430.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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Id.
DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1861 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1862-66.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1862.
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"Establishing injury," the Chief Justice said, "requires speculating that
elected officials will increase a taxpayer-plaintiff's tax bill to make up a
deficit; establishing redressability requires speculating that abolishing the
challenged credit will redound to the benefit of the taxpayer because
legislators will pass along the supposed increased revenue in the form of tax
reductions., 48 Such speculation cannot support standing, the Chief Justice
wrote, adding that "[a] taxpayer-plaintiff has no right to insist that the
government dispose of any increased revenue it might experience as a result
of his suit by decreasing his tax liability or bolstering programs that benefit
him.",49 "To the contrary," the Chief Justice said, "the decision of how to
allocate any such savings is the very epitome of a policy judgment
committed to the 'broad and legitimate discretion' of lawmakers,
which 'the
50
courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.'
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon51 offers another example of the new Chief
Justice's attention to the boundaries of the separation of powers and
federalism and respect for the limits on the authority of the federal judiciary.
The case concerned the availability of judicial relief for violations of Article
36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ratified by the United
States in 1969. 52 Article 36 of the Vienna Convention requires that if a
national of one country is detained by authorities in another country, the
authorities must provide notice of the detention to the consular post of the
detainee's home country upon the detainee's request. 53 The Convention
further provides that the authorities "shall inform" the detainee of the
consular notification right under Article 36.54
Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national, was arrested for involvement in a
police shooting in Oregon. He received Miranda warnings in English and
Spanish, but was not told he could request that the Mexican Consulate be
notified of his arrest pursuant to Article 36 of the Convention. He moved to
suppress his incriminating custodial statements because Oregon authorities
had failed to comply with Article 36. The state trial court denied
suppression, Sanchez-Llamas was convicted, and the Oregon Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court both affirmed. 55

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1862-63.
Id. at 1863.
Id. (quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (Kennedy, J.)).
126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
Id. at 2674-75.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2676.
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a decision by Chief Justice Roberts,
held that suppression was not required. The Chief Justice noted-and
deferred-the threshold question in the case: whether Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention 5rants rights that may be invoked by individuals in a
judicial proceeding. 5 This is a sensitive and difficult question of treaty
interpretation, and because the Court concluded that Sanchez-Llamas was
not entitled to relief on ' his
claim, the Chief Justice said it was "unnecessary
57
to resolve the question."
On the question of suppression, Sanchez-Llamas argued that the Court
should apply the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Article 36 violations
pursuant to the Court's "'authority to develop remedies for the enforcement
of federal law in state-court criminal proceedings."' 58 The Chief Justice's
opinion for the Court squarely rejected the premise of this argument: "To the
extent Sanchez-Llamas argues that we should invoke our supervisory
authority," he wrote, "the law is clear: 'It is beyond dispute that we do not
hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States.' 59 Instead,
the Chief Justice said, "our authority to create a judicial remedy applicable
in state court must lie, if anywhere, in the treaty itself."60 This is because
"[u]nder the Constitution, the President has the power, 'by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties."' 61 The Chief Justice
went on:
The United States ratified the [Vienna] Convention with the
expectation that it would be interpreted according to its terms....
If we were to require suppression for Article 36 violations without
some authority in the Convention, we would in effect be
supplementing those terms by enlarging the obligations of the
United States under the Convention.
This is entirely inconsistent
62
with the judicial function.
Amplifying the point, the Chief Justice continued:
Of course, it is well established that a self-executing treaty binds the
States pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, and that the States
therefore must recognize the force of the treaty in the course of
adjudicating the rights of litigants .... And where a treaty provides
for a particular judicial remedy, there is no issue of intruding on the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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Id. at 2677-78.
Id. at 2677.
Id. at 2679 (quoting Pet.'s Reply Br. in No. 04-10566 at 11).
Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000)).
Id.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl.
2).
Id.

[Vol. 34: 1027, 2007]

"Ofa JudiciaryNature"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

constitutional prerogatives of the States or other federal branches.
• .. But where a treaty does not provide a particular remedy, either
expressly or implicitly, it is not for the federal63courts to impose one
on the States through lawmaking of their own.
The Chief Justice, for a six-justice majority, concluded that the Convention
did not provide a suppression remedy for violations of Article 36, either
explicitly or implicitly.
Two other opinions from Chief Justice Roberts's first term are notable
for their deference to the legislative and executive branches: Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. ("FAIR"), 4 likely the
most reported of the Chief's first opinions for the Court, and his concurrence
in Rapanos v. United States. 65 Rumsfeld v. FAIR involved a First
Amendment challenge to the Solomon Amendment, enacted by Congress in
response to restrictions on military recruitment imposed by law schools in
opposition to the government's policy on homosexuals in the military. The
Solomon Amendment denies federal funding to any institution of higher
education that has a policy or practice that prevents military recruiters from
gaining access to students on campus at least equal to that provided to any
other recruiter. A coalition of law schools and law professors challenged the
law, claiming that it violated their First Amendment freedoms of speech
and association.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Solomon Amendment. In
his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts placed substantial emphasis
on the breadth of the congressional power to raise and support the military:
"The Constitution grants Congress the power to 'provide for the common
Defence,' '[t]o raise and support Armies,' and '[t]o provide and maintain a
Navy,' 66 he said. "Congress' power in this area 'is broad and sweeping,"'
he continued, "and ... includes the authority to require campus access for
military recruiters .... [T]he fact that legislation that raises armies is subject
to First Amendment constraints does not mean that we ignore the purpose of
this legislation when determining its constitutionality; as we [have]
recognized . . . 'judicial deference . . . is at its apogee'
when Congress
67
legislates under its authority to raise and support armies.'
The Chief Justice then noted that Congress "chose to secure campus
access for military recruiters indirectly," through a funding condition, but he

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 2680.
126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306 (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cls. 1, 12-13).
Id. (citations omitted).
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held that the "decision to proceed indirectly does not reduce the deference
given to Congress in the area of military affairs. Congress' choice to
promote its goal by creating a funding condition deserves at least as
deferential treatment as if Congress had imposed a mandate on
universities."' 68 He went on to conclude that because "[t]he Solomon
Amendment neither limits what law schools may say nor requires them to
say anything," the free speech rights of FAIR's members were not
implicated. 69 Neither were their expressive association rights; the Chief
Justice noted that the Solomon Amendment requires the law schools to
associate with military recruiters only "in the sense that they interact with
them. But recruiters are not part of the law school .. . [and do not] ...
70
become members of the school's expressive association."
Finally, the Chief Justice explained how the Third Circuit had
misapplied the Court's expressive conduct precedents by focusing on what it
said were "ample ...alternative means" for military recruiting other than
direct campus access: "The Court of Appeals' proposed alternative methods
of recruiting are beside the point," he said. "The issue is not whether other
means of raising an army and providing for a navy might be adequate....
That is a judgment for Congress, not the courts. . . . It suffices that the
means chosen by Congress add to the effectiveness of military
71
recruitment."
In Rapanos, the issue was the meaning of the term "navigable waters" in
the Clean Water Act. 72 Chief Justice Roberts joined a plurality opinion by
Justice Scalia, but wrote separately to declare his dismay that the Court had
not produced a majority holding and that the Army Corp of Engineers and
the Environmental Protection Agency had failed to complete rulemaking
about the scope of the statutory term. 73 The latter, the Chief Justice said,
might well have merited the Court's deference; the former meant continued
legal uncertainty.74
In an earlier case, the Court had rejected the Army Corps' expansive
position on the scope of its authority over navigable waters.75 As described
by the Chief Justice: "The Corps had taken the view that its authority was
essentially limitless; this Court explained that such a boundless view was
inconsistent with the limiting terms Congress had used in the [Clean Water]

68. Id.

69. Id. at 1307.
70. Id. at 1312.

71. Id. at 1311 (citations omitted).
72. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
73. Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
74. Id.

75. Id. at 2235 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (referring to the Court's decision in Solid Waste
Agency ofN. Cook Cty. v. Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)).
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Act." 76 Following that decision, the Corps and the EPA had initiated
rulemaking on the subject. The Chief Justice noted that while "[a]gencies
delegated rulemaking authority under a statute such as the Clean Water Act
are afforded generous leeway by the courts in interpreting the statute they
are entrusted to77 administer," the agency rulemaking in this instance
"went nowhere."
"Rather than refining its view of its authority," the Chief Justice
observed, "providing guidance meriting deference under our generous
standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of the
78
scope of its power. The upshot today is another defeat for the agency."
The Chief Justice offered this comment on the Court's failure to achieve a
majority holding: "It is unfortunate that no opinion commands a majority of
the Court on precisely how to read Congress' limits on the reach of the
regulated entities will now have to feel
Clean Water Act. Lower courts and
79
basis.
case-by-case
a
on
way
their
The Chief Justice also made his preference for clear holdings known in
his dissent in Georgia v. Randolph.80 The case presented the question of the
reasonableness of a warrantless search of a home based on the consent of
one occupant when another occupant is present and objects. The context
was a domestic dispute dispatch; the defendant's wife told responding
officers that her husband had a cocaine habit, and she consented to the police
entry and search. The husband, however, was present and expressly refused
his consent. A five-justice majority invalidated the ensuing search; the
Court held that "a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over
the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be
justified as reasonable81 as to him on the basis of consent given to the police
by another resident."
The Court based its holding in Randolph on an analysis of "widely
shared social expectations" that it said revealed "no common understanding
that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the
express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or
invitations to outsiders."8 2 The Court concluded, however, that it was "fair
to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no
confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 2235-36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id.
126 S. Ct. 1515, 1531 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1526.
Id. at 1523.
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enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, 'stay out."' 83 Accordingly,
the Court held, a "disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer
no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in
the absence of any consent at all." The Court suggested, however, that the
new rule it was establishing might not apply if the police had "good reason"
to believe a threat of domestic violence existed.85
The Chief Justice dissented, canvassing the Court's case law on consent
searches, including the long-accepted rule that a "warrantless search is
reasonable if police obtain the voluntary consent of a person authorized to
give it. Co-occupants have 'assumed the risk that one of their number might
permit [a] common area to be searched.' 86 The Chief Justice asserted that
the majority had "create[d] an exception to [an] otherwise clear rule." 87 He
thought the exception was arbitrary and insufficiently rooted in the privacy
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment: "The rule the majority
fashions," he said,
does not implement the high office of the Fourth Amendment to
protect privacy, but instead provides protection on a random and
happenstance basis, protecting, for example, a co-occupant who
happens to be at the front door when the other occupant consents to
a search,
but not one napping or watching television in the next
88
room.
The Chief Justice objected to the creation of a constitutional rule based
on an analysis of "social expectations" that he viewed as nothing more than
"a hunch about how people would typically act in an atypical situation." 89
"Such shifting expectations," he said, "are not a promising foundation on
which to ground a constitutional rule.' 90 The Chief Justice was especially
concerned about the uncertainties of applying the new rule in cases
involving domestic abuse: "The majority's rule," he said, "apparently
forbids police from entering to assist with a domestic dispute if the abuser
whose behavior prompted the request for police assistance objects." 91
Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote for the majority, but wrote
separately to explain his view of the limits of its holding. He first stated his
position that
83. Id. at
84. Id. at
85. Id. at
86. Id. at
n.7 (1974)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at
90. Id.
91. Id. at

1038

1522-23.
1523.
1525.
1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171

1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
1538 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

[Vol. 34: 1027, 2007]

"Ofa JudiciaryNature'"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

[i]f Fourth Amendment law forced us to choose between two brightline rules, (1) a rule that always found one tenant's consent
sufficient to justify a search without a warrant and (2) a rule that
never did, I believe we should choose the first. That is because, as
the Chief Justice's dissent points out, a rule permitting such
searches can serve important law enforcement needs (for example,
in domestic abuse cases) and the consenting party's joint tenancy
diminishes
the objecting party's reasonable expectation of
92
privacy.

However, Justice Breyer did not believe the majority opinion established a
bright-line rule, but, rather, a case-specific holding based on the particular
circumstances of the case; "were the circumstances to change significantly,"
Justice Breyer said, "so should the result." 93 "[W]ith these understandings,"
Justice Breyer joined the majority.94
Chief Justice Roberts saw some danger in this mode of decision: "The
concurrence joins with the apparent 'understandin[g]' that the majority's95
'rule' is not a rule at all, but simply a 'case-specific' holding," he said.
"The end result is a complete lack of96practical guidance for the police in the
field, let alone for the lower courts."

The Chief Justice also filed a partial dissent in the Court's major voting
rights case from the last term, League of United Latin American Citizens
("L ULA C") v. Perry,97 which involved a challenge to the Texas

congressional redistricting map. The plaintiffs in LULAC asserted that the
state's 2003 congressional redistricting map was an unconstitutional political
gerrymander and violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A three-judge
panel of the district court upheld the redistricting map against these
challenges. The Supreme Court, for the most part, affirmed. But the case
produced six separate opinions. The Court was splintered on the threshhold
question of whether claims of unconstitutional political gerrymandering are
justiciable, but a majority of the Court upheld the redistricting map against
this challenge on the ground that the plaintiffs had not in any event
articulated a 98
reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political
gerrymanders.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1529 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
Id. at 2612.
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A different majority of the Court, however, went on to hold that one of
the Latino majority-minority districts in the state's map violated section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act because it combined Latino communities that were
too geographically distant and politically distinct to be considered
"compact" under section 2. 99 Chief Justice Roberts dissented from this
aspect of the lead opinion largely because he viewed its conclusions to be
insufficiently deferential to the factfinding of the district court under the
"clear error" standard of review, and insufficiently deferential to the
discretion retained by state legislatures to draw district lines in compliance
with section 2.100 The Chief Justice also believed the majority had distorted
the "compactness" inquiry in section 2 litigation: "Far from imposing a
freestanding compactness obligation on the States," he said,
we have repeatedly emphasized that "States retain broad discretion
in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of § 2"... and that
§ 2 itself imposes "no per se prohibitions against particular types of
districts" .....
We have said that the States retain "flexibility" in
complying with voting rights obligations that "federal courts
enforcing § 2 lack."''1 1
Chief Justice Roberts summarized his disagreement with the majority in
this way:
The State has drawn a redistricting plan that provides six of seven
congressional districts with an effective majority of Latino votingage citizens in south and west Texas, and it is not possible to
provide more. The majority nonetheless faults the state plan
because of the particularmix of Latino voters forming the majority
in one of the six districts . . . . This despite the express factual
findings, from judges far more familiar with Texas than we are, that
the State's new district would be a more effective Latino majority
district than [the] old [one] ever was, and despite the fact that any
plan would necessarily
leave some Latino voters outside a Latino02
majority district. 1
The Chief Justice concluded with this:
Whatever the majority believes it is fighting with its holding, it is
not vote dilution on the basis of race or ethnicity. I do not believe it
is our role to make judgments about which mixes of minority voters

99. See id. at 2652-62 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2660 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 2662-63 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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should count for purposes of forming a majority in an electoral
district, in the face of factual findings that the district is an effective
majority-minority district. It is a sordid business, this divvying us
up by race. When a State's plan already provides the maximum
possible number of majority-minority effective opportunity districts,
and the minority enjoys effective political power in the area well in
excess of its proportion of the population, I would conclude that the
courts have no further role to play in rejiggering the district lines
under § 2.103
And, finally, Chief Justice Roberts's stated affinity for checks on the
exercise of judicial discretion was readily apparent in his opinion for a
unanimous Court in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.104 At issue in Martin
was the attorney's fees provision in the federal removal statute that
authorizes an award of costs and attorney's fees when a case is remanded to
state court because removal was jurisdictionally improper. One side urged
that the provision be interpreted to make an award of fees automatic upon
remand. The Chief Justice rejected that interpretation as inconsistent with
the statutory text, which provides that the district court "'may' require
5
"The word 'may,'
payment of attorney's fees-not 'shall' or 'should.' ' 10
06
discretion."'
the Chief Justice said, "clearly connotes
The Solicitor General had appeared in the case and urged that the statute
be construed narrowly, to permit an award of fees only where the
unsuccessful removal was "frivolous." The Chief Justice rejected this
argument as well, seeing nothing in the "statutory language and context" to
[the removal statute] should either
support an interpretation "that fees under
,,107
The statute left the award of
usually be granted or usually be denied.

attorney's fees "to the district court's discretion, with no heavy
congressional thumb on either side of the scales."' 8 But, the Chief Justice
09
wrote, this "does not mean that no legal standard governs that discretion."'
Citing again to Chief Justice Marshall, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: "We

have it on good authority that 'a motion to [a court's] discretion is a motion,

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 2663 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
126 S. Ct. 704 (2005).
Id. at 709.
Id. (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994)).
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
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not to its inclination, but to
0 its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by
sound legal principles."'"
He continued: "Discretion is not whim, and limiting discretion
according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle of justice that
like cases should be decided alike.""'1 The Court held that attorney's fees
under the removal statute may be awarded "only where the removing party
lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely,
when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.""12
I have left out some of Chief Justice Roberts's first-term opinions-he
wrote eight opinions for the Court and five concurrences and dissents-but
you've been listening patiently for a long time, and this is certainly a
representative-enough sample. Perhaps you find yourself agreeing with the
Chief's opinions, perhaps not. But as I said when I began, my focus today is
on reasoning, not results, and there is enough in this collection of the new
Chief Justice's early work to draw some preliminary inferences about his
approach to decisionmaking. And the inferences I would draw are these: He
appears to be strongly rooted in the discipline of traditional legal method,
evincing a fidelity to text, structure, history, and the constitutional hierarchy.
He exhibits the restraint that flows from the careful application of
established decisional rules and the practice of reasoning from the case law.
He appears to place great stock in the process-oriented tools and doctrinal
rules that guard against the aggregation of judicial power and keep judicial
discretion in check: jurisdictional limits, structural federalism, textualism,
and the procedural rules that govern the scope ofjudicial review.
Given the Chief Justice's apparent inclination in favor of rulings that
clearly articulate "what the law is," it seems unlikely that he will be a fan of
the weighing-and-balancing middle-ground compromises that characterize
some of the late-Rehnquist Court's work. When the Chief Justice
announced his preference for narrow decisions as a means of producing
greater consensus on the Court, I don't think he meant "narrow" in the sense
of fact-specific rulings that resolve the case before the Court but do not
produce a clear legal rationale. That much seems clear from his concurrence
in Rapanos and his dissent in Randolph. Also, fact-based balancing tests
tend to enlarge the role of the courts at the expense of the other branches,
and our new Chief Justice seems positively allergic to that.
Time will tell whether Chief Justice Roberts succeeds in his objective of
creating greater consensus on the Court. The Chief Justice is first among
equals, and the opportunity to attract justices from across the philosophical
spectrum to his approach to judging will be stronger in some cases than

110. Id. (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d)
(Marshall, C.J.)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 711.
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others. This term will undoubtedly hold many tests, as some of the
commentators predicted.
I began our review of Chief Justice Roberts's first-term opinions with
the DaimlerChryslercase on the constitutional doctrine of standing; in that
case, the Chief Justice quoted James Madison on the Founders'
understanding that the jurisdiction of the federal courts was limited to cases
"of a Judiciary Nature." Perhaps, in a somewhat different sense, this phrase
can be applied to our new Chief Justice as well.
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